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Summary
Background As the incomes of many AIDS-burdened countries grow and donors’ budgets for helping to ﬁ ght the 
disease tighten, national governments and external funding partners increasingly face the following question: what is 
the capacity of countries that are highly aﬀ ected by AIDS to ﬁ nance their responses from domestic sources, and how 
might this aﬀ ect the level of donor support? In this study, we attempt to answer this question.
Methods We propose metrics to estimate domestic AIDS ﬁ nancing, using methods related to national prioritisation 
of health spending, disease burden, and economic growth. We apply these metrics to 12 countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa with a high prevalence of HIV/AIDS, generating scenarios of possible future domestic expenditure. We 
compare the results with total AIDS ﬁ nancing requirements to calculate the size of the resulting funding gaps and 
implications for donors.
Findings Nearly all 12 countries studied fall short of the proposed expenditure benchmarks. If they met these 
benchmarks fully, domestic spending on AIDS would increase by 2·5 times, from US$2·1 billion to $5·1 billion 
annually, covering 64% of estimated future funding requirements and leaving a gap of around a third of the total 
$7·9 billion needed. Although upper-middle-income countries, such as Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa, would 
become ﬁ nancially self-reliant, lower-income countries, such as Mozambique and Ethiopia, would remain heavily 
dependent on donor funds.
Interpretation The proposed metrics could be useful to stimulate further analysis and discussion around domestic 
spending on AIDS and corresponding donor contributions, and to structure ﬁ nancial agreements between recipient 
country governments and donors. Coupled with improved resource tracking, such metrics could enhance transparency 
and accountability for eﬃ  cient use of money and maximise the eﬀ ect of available funding to prevent HIV infections 
and save lives.
Funding US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
Copyright © Hecht et al. Open Access article distributed under the terms of CC BY-NC-ND.
Introduction
Flows of aid earmarked for AIDS programmes have 
increased dramatically in the past decade,1 fuelling a 
rapid scale-up of services with widely documented 
positive eﬀ ects, including the prevention of millions of 
deaths and falling rates of new infections in many low-
income and middle-income countries.2,3 However, the 
unprecedented growth in international ﬁ nancing of the 
AIDS response in the past decade seems to have stalled 
just as compelling evidence of the potential of 
antiretroviral therapy to accelerate the decline in new 
infections4 and further advances in prevention such as 
pre-exposure prophylaxis are motivating increasingly 
ambitious goals for programme scale-up.5,6 Projected 
funding falls short of what is needed to meet even the 
most conservative goals that predated the recent push to 
accelerate treatment expansion as a prevention strategy.6–8 
In 2011, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV 
and AIDS (UNAIDS) set targets for increasing AIDS 
funding to US$22–24 billion by 2015.7,8 Most recently, 
UNAIDS has estimated that a more ambitious “fast 
track” response will require increases to US$35 billion 
per year by 2020,8 yet only $19 billion was available in 
2012, nearly half of which was provided by international 
donors.9 Of these donors, the US President’s Emergency 
Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) contributed the largest 
share, representing 49% of all international 
contributions,9 followed by the Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, which provided 22%.10
In recognition of the long-term ﬁ nancial obligations 
associated with scaled-up programmes,11 many 
stakeholders, including external funding organisations, 
low-income and middle-income countries, and advocacy 
groups, are concerned about the extent to which external 
funders will be willing and able to sustain existing AIDS 
programmes, and the corresponding degree to which 
low-income and middle-income countries will be able to 
allocate additional ﬁ nancial resources to ﬁ ght the 
pandemic. Many policy makers have focused on 
broadening the base of ﬁ nancial support, with a particular 
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emphasis on increasing domestic funding from 
government budgets.9,12–16 At the United Nations General 
Assembly in 2011, UNAIDS called for “shared 
responsibility to meet investment needs” through 
increased long-term domestic and international funding, 
and proposed that recipient governments be held 
accountable for increasing domestic investment.17 
Subsequently, the African Union embraced a new 
concept of shared responsibility and global solidarity that 
emphasises an increased role for domestic ﬁ nancing of 
AIDS programmes and domestic leadership in deﬁ ning 
AIDS priorities and directing resources.15 This priority is 
echoed in the Global Fund’s policies on country 
graduation and counterpart ﬁ nancing, which are 
designed to encourage countries to play a larger part in 
ﬁ nancing their AIDS programmes as their economies 
grow.18 Similarly, PEPFAR’s multi-year partnership 
framework agreements and partnership framework 
implementation plans promote a transition of 
programmatic ownership to partner governments, 
including increased responsibility for the ﬁ nancial 
support of programmes.19 Simultaneously, countries 
aﬀ ected by AIDS have shown an interest in having a 
greater role in directing and ﬁ nancing their AIDS 
programmes than they have had in the past decade. 
Between 2006 and 2012, low-income and middle-income 
countries as a group have doubled their domestically 
sourced ﬁ nancing for AIDS programmes from about 
$5 billion to $10 billion, such that domestic spending 
exceeded international disbursements.8
The increasing focus on domestic ﬁ nancial support 
creates a demand for new approaches and metrics to 
evaluate the intensity and adequacy of domestic eﬀ ort, 
and to assess the potential for additional domestic 
ﬁ nancing. UNAIDS has developed an indicator called the 
Domestic Investment Priority Index, which measures 
government AIDS expenditures relative to country 
income level and HIV prevalence.20 The index is useful to 
rank countries and identify low performers. Similarly, 
Galárraga and colleagues21 recently used a peer approach, 
in which they compared AIDS spending per person 
living with HIV against an expected level estimated from 
a median regression model with gross national income 
per person, health spending as a proportion of gross 
national income, and debt service per person as 
predictors. Their study is useful to describe and compare 
the eﬀ orts of countries to ﬁ nance their AIDS programmes 
and to show the eﬀ ect on ﬁ nancing gaps if countries with 
quite weak eﬀ orts were to perform more like their peers.
In this paper, we contribute a related, but diﬀ erent, 
approach to the examination of government AIDS 
expenditures, with a focus on 12 sub-Saharan African 
countries that have historically been the largest recipients 
of PEPFAR funding, with recent combined allocations of 
more than $3 billion annually.22 We propose a set of 
benchmarks that could be used to assess whether present 
levels of domestic contributions are aligned with 
countries’ ﬁ scal capacity and disease burdens. On the 
basis of these benchmarks, we estimate the extent to 
which governments might make a greater domestic 
contribution, the eﬀ ect of such increased domestic eﬀ ort 
on AIDS ﬁ nancing gaps, and the implications for donors. 
A key diﬀ erence from previous work is that the 
benchmarks are not tied to the historical past 
performance of countries, but rather are intended to be 
normative standards, based on existing statements of 
political commitment and notions of fair allocation. A 
second diﬀ erence is that we used a more diverse and up-
to-date set of sources for AIDS spending than those in 
previous work by Galárraga and colleagues21 and Ávila 
and colleagues.23
In reality, the practicality of any proposed scale-up of 
domestic ﬁ nancial eﬀ ort in the AIDS response depends 
on many country-speciﬁ c factors. Forging of agreements 
regarding funding targets will need consideration of 
these factors in bilateral or multilateral negotiations. Our 
aim in this report is to propose a set of reference points, 
constructed from publicly available data and based on 
normative goals, to help focus these discussions.
Methods
We reviewed available information in National AIDS 
Spending Assessments, National Health Accounts HIV 
Sub-Accounts, Public Expenditure Reviews, United 
Nations General Assembly Country Progress Reports, 
and other country reports about domestically sourced 
public ﬁ nancing of AIDS programmes since 2006 in 
12 African countries and constructed several indicators to 
compare these countries’ levels of domestic eﬀ ort, in 
which we considered epidemic size, resource needs, 
ﬁ scal capacity, and amount of external assistance for 
AIDS. The countries—Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, South 
Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia—account for 
52% of AIDS cases worldwide,3 56% of total development 
assistance targeted to AIDS,24 and 83% of PEPFAR’s 
historical bilateral spending.22
Individual country data
Table 1 presents the key country characteristics used in the 
analysis. According to UNAIDS-compiled data,26 adult 
HIV prevalence in 2013 ranged from 1·2% in Ethiopia to 
22% in Botswana, and the number of people living with 
HIV varied from 200 000 in Rwanda to 6·3 million in 
South Africa. The contribution of AIDS to the national 
disease burden measured in disability-adjusted life-years 
(DALYs) for 2005 ranged from 6% in Ethiopia to 46% in 
South Africa.25 The 12 focus countries vary greatly in per-
person income amounts, from US$540 in Ethiopia to 
$7140 in Botswana,27 but, to obtain a more reﬁ ned picture 
of the governments’ abilities to pay for AIDS programmes 
in the short-to-medium term, we considered the subsets 
of resources from which domestically sourced public 
funding for AIDS programmes is drawn. Total government 
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expenditures, measured as a share of gross domestic 
product (GDP), ranged from 17% in Ethiopia to 37% in 
Namibia.27 Although the AIDS response is usually 
multisectoral, most public funding for AIDS programmes 
ﬂ ows through the health sector. The proportions of 
government expenditures devoted to health varied from 
6% in Kenya to 22% in Rwanda.28
Indicators of domestic ﬁ nancial contribution to the 
AIDS response
We obtained estimates of past AIDS expenditure (total 
and domestic) from a review of publicly available country 
AIDS spending reports (appendix p 3). No widely 
accepted normative standard exists for what level of 
domestic spending represents a fair, aﬀ ordable, or 
reasonable share of AIDS programme ﬁ nancing. To 
assess existing levels of domestic public ﬁ nancing of 
AIDS programmes and estimate how much money a 
country might be able to allocate to these programmes, 
we used several reference points. Key among them were 
the Abuja target for government health spending (ie, 15% 
of the budget),29 which emphasises adequate priority for 
health generally, and the share of a country’s disease 
burden that is caused by AIDS—here referred to as the 
DALY share—which takes the current level of health 
expenditure as a given and restricts the focus to health 
expenditure on AIDS relative to other health priorities. 
The original Abuja pledge in 2001 has been reaﬃ  rmed 
and remains a well-recognised development target, 
although most countries have not yet achieved its 
proposed level for health spending.6,30
Within the health sector, one indicator of adequate 
priority for AIDS is the ratio of its share of domestic 
health expenditure to its share of the total disease burden 
measured in DALYs. Although the share of the health 
budget allocated to AIDS is expected to be positively and 
consistently associated with the disease’s DALY share 
across a similar set of countries, allocation of health 
resources solely in proportion to disease burden will not 
necessarily maximise the health eﬀ ect because it does 
not consider the cost-eﬀ ectiveness of available 
interventions targeting AIDS and other health priorities.31 
To be conservative, and to avoid the risk of over-allocation 
of resources to AIDS, we assumed that the benchmark 
ratio of AIDS’s share of domestic government health 
expenditure (government expenditure on AIDS as a 
proportion of government expenditure on health overall) 
to AIDS’s share of disease burden (AIDS DALYs as a 
proportion of total DALYs) is 0·5. In other words, a 
country in which 10% of the total disease burden is 
attributable to AIDS would be expected to spend at least 
5% of its health budget on AIDS programmes. This 
benchmark value is consistent with empirical data that 
suggest that this level of spending is achievable in low-
income and middle-income countries that have moderate 
to severe AIDS epidemics. For example, of the 
30 countries reporting to UNAIDS since 2008 that have 
AIDS burdens greater than 3500 AIDS DALYs per 100 000 
population (to match the 12 countries in our sample), ten 
had ratios higher than 0·5, including seven low-income 
countries and ﬁ ve in which AIDS represents more than 
10% of total DALY burden.25
In addition to the benchmarks discussed previously, 
Williams and Gouws32 constructed an aﬀ ordability index 
for universal antiretroviral therapy in which less than 1% 
of GDP is aﬀ ordable, between 1% and 2% is marginal, 
and more than 2% is viewed as onerous and unaﬀ ordable, 
since it draws funds away from other domestic priorities. 
Haacker33 also suggests an aﬀ ordability threshold for 
AIDS spending of 1% of GDP. We calculated government 
AIDS expenditure as a share of GDP to enable 
comparisons against this reference point.
Forward-looking ﬁ nancial projections
We applied the Abuja target and DALY share benchmarks 
for domestic ﬁ nancing eﬀ ort to the 12 countries to 
establish what level of spending they would generate in 
the next 5 years, and to what extent this increased eﬀ ort 
would ﬁ ll resource gaps and aﬀ ect the need for external 
assistance. These calculations are based on ﬁ nancial 
resource needs estimates from the UNAIDS investment 
framework (appendix p 1).7
We considered scenarios based on four ways in which a 
country’s domestic expenditure on AIDS might grow: 
(1) a minimum increase through expanded government 
revenue and spending driven by expected macroeconomic 
AIDS disease burden Ability to pay for AIDS programmes
Adult HIV 
prevalence 
in 2013*
People living 
with HIV in 
2013*
AIDS’s share of 
total disease 
burden in 
200525 
GDP per 
person 
(US$) in 
2013†
Government 
expenditure 
as share of 
GDP 
(GGE/GDP) 
in 2013†
Health share 
of 
government 
expenditure 
(GHE/GGE) in 
2012‡
Low-income countries
Ethiopia 1% 790 000 6% 540 17% 11%
Kenya 6% 1 600 000 22% 1020 31% 6%
Mozambique 11% 1 600 000 18% 590 36% 9%
Rwanda 3% 200 000 12% 700 28% 22%
Tanzania 5% 1 400 000 20% 700 27% 10%
Uganda 7% 1 600 000 14% 630 18% 10%
Lower-middle-income countries
Côte d’Ivoire 3% 370 000 13% 1180 24% 8%
Nigeria 3% 3 200 000 7% 1690 24% 7%
Zambia 13% 1 100 000 28% 1540 30% 16%
Upper-middle-income countries
Botswana 22% 320 000 44% 7140 33% 8%
Namibia 14% 250 000 39% 5670 37% 14%
South Africa 19% 6 300 000 46% 6620 33% 13%
AIDS’s share of total disease burden is measured in disability-adjusted life-years. GDP=gross domestic product. 
GGE=general government expenditure. GHE=government expenditure on health. *UNAIDS GAP Report 2014.26 
†International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook April 2014.27 ‡WHO National Health Accounts.28 
 Table 1: Indicators of AIDS disease burden and ability to pay for AIDS programmes
See Online for appendix
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trends (economic trends scenario); and larger rises 
linked to (2) increasing government health expenditure 
to the Abuja target level, in addition to gains from 
economic trends (Abuja target scenario); (3) allocation of 
the national health budget such that the portion of 
budget for AIDS is set equal to 0·5 times AIDS’s share of 
disease burden, in addition to gains from economic 
trends (DALY share scenario); and (4) a combination of 
all three of these methods, resulting in a maximum eﬀ ort 
scenario. We also calculated government AIDS 
expenditure under the Abuja target and DALY share 
scenarios without economic trends, holding total 
government expenditure constant in the Abuja target 
calculations, and holding government health expenditure 
constant in the DALY share calculations.
For each scenario, we calculated the implied domestic 
ﬁ scal contribution and its share of total projected AIDS 
resource needs for the country in 2014–18. We then 
calculated the amount by which donors could reduce their 
support in each country. We calculated overall savings 
under the assumption that savings are reallocated to ﬁ ll 
the remaining funding gaps in the 12 countries and 
assuming that donors do not reallocate savings. The 
former scenario is especially relevant in light of a new 
analysis showing that the three upper-middle-income 
countries analysed here (Botswana, Namibia, and South 
Africa) have historically received more donor AIDS 
funding than expected based on their disease burden and 
income levels,1 and that reallocated development assistance 
for health and AIDS could lead to improved resource 
allocation.1 Baseline PEPFAR support was based on 2012 
country operating plans ($3·3 billion annually) and our 
estimate of support from other donors in 2012 ($1·1 billion 
annually) was based on the ratio of PEPFAR to other 
donors in the most recent (2010) reported estimates of 
development assistance for health targeting HIV/AIDS.24
Role of the funding source
The funder selected the set of 12 countries that were the 
focus of the analysis. The funder had no other role in 
study design, data collection, data analysis, data 
interpretation, or writing of the report. The corresponding 
author had ﬁ nal responsibility for the decision to submit 
for publication.
Results
Table 2 summarises the most recent available data about 
national AIDS expenditure per country and presents four 
comparative metrics: the domestic share of total AIDS 
expenditure; the share of government health expenditure 
devoted to AIDS relative to AIDS’s share of the disease 
burden (ratio of government AIDS expenditure/
government health expenditure to AIDS DALYs/total 
DALYs); government AIDS expenditure as a fraction of 
Most recent 
AIDS spending 
estimate year*
Total amounts
(millions of US$)
Amounts per person living with HIV† 
(US$)
GAE indicators‡
RNE EAE GAE RNE per 
person 
living with 
HIV
(GAE+EAE) 
per person 
living with 
HIV
GAE per 
person 
living with 
HIV
GAE/
(GAE+EAE) 
GAE/GHE Ratio of GAE/
GHE to AIDS 
DALYs/total 
DALYs
GAE/GDP
Low-income countries
Ethiopia 2012 349 350 55 426 494 67 13·6% 7·0% 1·16 0·13%
Kenya 2010 564 314 84 376 265 56 20·5% 14·7% 0·67 0·26%
Mozambique 2011 307 247 13 205 173 9 5·1% 3·8% 0·21 0·11%
Rwanda 2013 129 224 20 647 1220 100 8·2% 4·2% 0·35 0·27%
Tanzania 2011 362 432 8 258 314 6 1·2% 1·2% 0·06 0·03%
Uganda 2011 278 446 53 199 356 38 10·6% 14·7% 1·05 0·29%
Lower-middle-income countries
Côte d’Ivoire 2012 244 93 12 643 276 32 11·8% 3·0% 0·23 0·05%
Nigeria 2012 759 451 123 230 174 37 21·4% 2·6% 0·37 0·05%
Zambia 2013 320 229 38 291 243 35 14·4% 3·7% 0·13 0·17%
Upper-middle-income countries
Botswana 2012 178 106 267 556 1166 834 71·5% 61·6% 1·40 1·85%
Namibia 2012 108 136 175 449 1296 729 56·1% 26·3% 0·67 1·33%
South Africa 2010 1553 265 1218 255 243 200 82·1% 8·3% 0·18 0·33%
GAE=government expenditure on AIDS. RNE=resource needs estimate. EAE=external AIDS expenditure. DALY=disability-adjusted life-year. GDP=gross domestic product. 
GHE=government expenditure on health. *Sources of AIDS expenditure data are shown in appendix p 3. †Population of people living with HIV corresponds to year of GAE 
estimate and was obtained from UNAIDS GAP Report 2014,26 RNE is from the UNAIDS Investment Framework7 and corresponds to year of GAE estimate. ‡DALYs are for year 
2005 as estimated in the 2010 Global Burden of Disease study,25 GDP is from International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook April 2014,27 and GHE is from WHO 
National Health Accounts.28
Table 2: Recent government and external AIDS expenditure
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GDP; and government AIDS expenditure per person 
living with HIV.
The three upper-middle-income countries (Botswana, 
Namibia, and South Africa) are the only ones to fund 
most of their AIDS programmes from domestic sources. 
Nigeria and Kenya contribute about 20% of their total 
national AIDS spending, whereas all other countries 
account for less than 15% of the total. Excluding the three 
upper-middle-income countries, external funding covers 
an average of 87% of all AIDS spending, which 
emphasises the heavy dependence of the high-burden, 
low-income African countries on donor aid.34
Botswana’s domestic spending on AIDS amounts to 
1·9% of GDP, and Namibia is the only other country that 
allocates more than 1% of GDP to AIDS through its 
government budget (table 2). Four countries (Kenya, 
Rwanda, South Africa, and Uganda) have domestic outlays 
for AIDS that constitute 0·25–0·5% of GDP. Ethiopia, 
Mozambique, and Zambia devote between 0·1% and 
0·2%, and the remaining countries (Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, 
and Tanzania) spend less than 0·05% of their GDP on 
AIDS. These results suggest that ten of these 12 countries 
are well below the Williams-Gouws threshold of 1–2% of 
GDP.32
The ratio of AIDS’s share of government health 
spending to AIDS’s share of disease burden varies widely 
from 0·06 to 1·40 (table 2). The average ratio is 0·75 for 
the three upper-middle-income countries, although 
South Africa is well below the other two countries (ratio 
of 0·18). The average is 0·48  for the remaining nine low-
income and lower-middle-income countries, but only in 
ﬁ ve of the 12 countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, 
Botswana, and Namibia) does AIDS’s share of 
government health expenditure exceed the benchmark of 
0·5 times AIDS’s share of total disease burden.
Table 3 shows the estimated level of government 
expenditure on AIDS under the four scenarios on an 
average annual basis during 2014–18, and table 4 shows 
these same values as a proportion of the total number of 
people living with HIV. Table 5 builds on tables 3 and 4 
by presenting aggregate results for all countries and also 
showing the potential implications for donors. Appendix 
pp 6–14 display year-by-year results at national level and 
also results from the Abuja target and DALY share 
scenarios without combining these targets with economic 
trends. In most scenarios, the benchmark government 
AIDS expenditure levels for the three upper-middle-
income countries exceed the resource needs estimate 
projected by the UNAIDS investment framework, 
suggesting that these countries would be able to ﬁ nance 
their entire AIDS response without external aid. Our 
main results in tables 3, 4, and 5 constrain government 
AIDS expenditure so that it does not exceed the resource 
needs estimate, but appendix pp 5–14 include the 
unrestricted results.
Under the most conservative scenario—the economic 
trends scenario—average annual domestic AIDS spending 
for the 12 countries would rise 16% from $2·1 billion to 
$2·4 billion (table 3), with South Africa accounting for 
more than half of this increase. The projected aggregate 
domestic eﬀ ort from this scenario would meet just 30% of 
the total AIDS resource needs of the 12 countries (table 5). 
Only Botswana and Namibia would have spending levels 
high enough to cover their full programme requirements 
and only two other countries (South Africa and Kenya) 
would cover more than 25% of their needs (table 5).
Under the Abuja target scenario, total domestic AIDS 
spending would increase by more than half to reach an 
average of $3·2 billion per year for 2014–18, representing 
40% of the 12 countries’ entire AIDS funding needs 
(table 5). South Africa would account for 38% of this 
increase in national outlays, with Kenya accounting for 
32% and Nigeria 19%. Kenya, Mozambique, and Côte 
d’Ivoire would more than triple their government 
expenditure on AIDS. No additional countries would 
become self-suﬃ  cient, but two additional countries 
UNAIDS 
Investment 
Framework 
resource needs 
estimate (2013 
US$ millions)*
Government expenditure (2013 US$ millions) on AIDS, by 
scenario†
Baseline 
government 
expenditure 
on AIDS in 
2013‡
Economic 
trends 
scenario
Abuja 
target 
scenario§
DALY 
share 
scenario§
Maximum 
eﬀ ort 
scenario§
Low-income countries
Ethiopia $455 $55 $75 $103 $75 $103
Kenya $670 $84 $177 $441 $177 $441
Mozambique $554 $13 $26 $44 $62 $105
Rwanda $131 $20 $27 $27 $38 $38
Tanzania $527 $8 $15 $22 $129 $186
Uganda $411 $53 $73 $117 $73 $117
Lower-middle-income 
countries
Côte d’Ivoire $328 $12 $24 $46 $51 $96
Nigeria $1092 $123 $161 $327 $218 $440
Zambia $375 $38 $51 $51 $191 $191
Upper-middle-income 
countries
Botswana $215 $267 $215 $215 $215 $215
Namibia $141 $175 $141 $141 $141 $141
South Africa $3003 $1218 $1416 $1635 $3003 $3003
Total $7901 $2066 $2402 $3169 $4373 $5077
Percentage increase 
compared with baseline
NA NA 16% 53% 112% 146%
NA=not applicable. *Average annual resource needs estimates from the UNAIDS Investment Framework 2014–18. 
†Projected government expenditure on AIDS is constrained not to exceed UNAIDS Investment Framework resource 
needs. Values in italics indicate that the projected expenditure was capped by resource need. ‡The latest estimate of 
government AIDS expenditure found in country AIDS spending report. Most are from years 2010–13 (see table 2). 
Older estimates are carried forward to 2013 as a constant spending level. §These scenarios also include expected 
increases in government expenditure on AIDS because of economic trends.
 Table 3: Average annual government AIDS expenditures in 2014–18 under alternative scenarios
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(Kenya and South Africa) would cover more than 50% of 
their resource needs estimate, and two additional 
countries (Nigeria and Uganda) would generate more 
than 25% of their needs (table 5).
In the DALY share scenario, aggregate government 
expenditure on AIDS for the 12 countries would grow to 
$4·4 billion per year—about double the baseline amount 
(table 3). South Africa alone would account for more than 
three-quarters of this increase. This amount of spending 
would be suﬃ  cient to cover 55% of total AIDS programme 
needs in the 12 countries, and all three upper-middle-
income countries would fully cover their resource needs 
estimates. Rwanda and Nigeria would almost double their 
spending. Mozambique, Tanzania, Côte d’Ivoire, and 
Zambia would increase their government expenditure on 
AIDS by between 4·2 and 16 times the most recent 
estimates of spending. Still, without external aid, only one 
country (Zambia) besides the three upper-middle-income 
countries would be able to cover more than 50% of the 
resource needs estimate, and six countries (Côte d’Ivoire, 
Tanzania, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Uganda) 
would still be contributing less than 25% of the resource 
needs estimate.
Under the maximum eﬀ ort scenario, in which countries 
meet both the Abuja and the DALY share targets (in 
addition to building on the eﬀ ects of projected 
macroeconomic growth), total average annual government 
expenditure on AIDS would increase by 2·5 times, 
reaching $5·1 billion, which is suﬃ  cient to cover 64% of 
total AIDS ﬁ nancial needs. All three upper-middle-income 
countries would fully cover their AIDS programmes’ 
resource needs estimate, ﬁ ve countries (Botswana, 
Namibia, South Africa, Kenya, and Zambia) would cover 
more than half of their resource needs, and all countries 
except Ethiopia and Mozambique would domestically 
fund at least 25% of their resource needs estimate.
The implications of increased domestic spending for 
donors’ funding levels depend on what is assumed 
regarding the donors’ willingness to reallocate savings in 
one country to other countries in which resource need 
estimate gaps persist. We estimate that the potential 
annual reduction in donor support in 2014–18 could be 
$0·7 billion (16%) in the economic trends scenario, 
$1·0 billion (24%) in the Abuja target scenario, $1·4 billion 
(31%) in the DALY share scenario, and $1·8 billion (41%) 
in the maximum eﬀ ort scenario (table 5). If we assume 
that donors reallocate these savings to ﬁ ll remaining gaps 
in these 12 countries, net reductions in donor outlays 
would occur only under the DALY share ($0·8 billion 
[18%]) and maximum eﬀ ort ($1·5 billion [35%]) scenarios. 
We estimate that about three-quarters of the reductions 
would accrue to PEPFAR (table 5).
Discussion
By applying benchmarks for health spending and AIDS’s 
share of the health budget to a set of high-burden 
countries, and also factoring in projected macroeconomic 
trends, we show that in general the 12 countries will be 
able to ﬁ nance a greater share of the costs of their AIDS 
programmes in the next 5 years. Nevertheless, in several 
countries, even if a maximum domestic eﬀ ort is 
undertaken, support from donors will still be needed. 
Our analysis of resource gaps and implications for 
residual donor funding might help to outline the 
possibilities for shared ﬁ nancial responsibility between 
governments and donors in the future. The ﬁ ndings 
could also be useful to shape national policy dialogue and 
target-setting in partnership frameworks and other 
similar compacts and agreements between countries 
with large AIDS burdens and their donor partners.
Our analysis contributes to, and is largely consistent 
with, the recent eﬀ ort to provide policy makers with 
information to assess levels of domestic ﬁ nancing for 
AIDS programmes and inform discussions between 
AIDS donors and recipient governments (panel). Ávila 
and colleagues23 identiﬁ ed signiﬁ cant factors associated 
with increased domestic AIDS expenditure, isolating 
GDP per person and HIV prevalence as positive 
correlates of government expenditure on AIDS. The 
benchmarks we studied are constructed so that AIDS 
UNAIDS Investment 
Framework resource 
needs estimate per 
person living with 
HIV (2013 US$)*
Government expenditure (2013 US$) on AIDS per person 
living with HIV, by scenario†
Baseline 
government 
expenditure 
on AIDS in 
2013‡ 
Economic 
trends 
scenario
Abuja 
target 
scenario§
DALY share 
scenario§
Maximum 
eﬀ ort 
scenario§
Low-income countries
Ethiopia $563 $67 $92 $128 $92 $128
Kenya $413 $84 $109 $272 $109 $272
Mozambique $322 $9 $15 $26 $36 $61
Rwanda $655 $89 $134 $134 $189 $189
Tanzania $363 $6 $11 $15 $89 $128
Uganda $262 $35 $46 $75 $46 $75
Lower-middle-income countries
Côte d’Ivoire $886 $39 $66 $123 $139 $261
Nigeria $329 $39 $49 $98 $66 $133
Zambia $327 $14 $44 $44 $166 $166
Upper-middle-income countries
Botswana $653 $653 $653 $653 $653 $653
Namibia $565 $565 $565 $565 $565 $565
South Africa $438 $195 $207 $239 $438 $438
*Average annual resource needs estimates from the UNAIDS Investment Framework 2014–18. †Projected government 
AIDS expenditure is constrained not to exceed UNAIDS Investment Framework resource needs. Values in italics 
indicate that the projected expenditure was capped by resource need. ‡The latest estimate of government AIDS 
expenditure found in country AIDS spending report. Most are from years 2010–13 (see table 2). Older estimates are 
carried forward to 2013 as a constant spending level. §These scenarios also include expected increases in government 
expenditure on AIDS because of economic trends.
 Table 4: Average annual government AIDS expenditures per person living with HIV in 2014–18 under 
alternative scenarios
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spending targets are larger, with all other factors 
remaining equal, in higher-income countries, and in 
countries with a larger disease burden. Also consistent 
with previous work by others, we report a large amount 
of variation in AIDS spending that is not explained by 
countries’ income level or AIDS epidemic size. Galárraga 
and colleagues21 compared AIDS spending per person 
living with HIV against an expected level estimated from 
a median regression model with gross national income 
per person, health spending as a proportion of gross 
national income, and debt service per person as 
predictors.21 In their analysis, Galárraga and colleagues 
concluded, for the countries we studied in common, that 
Uganda, Nigeria, Namibia, Côte d’Ivoire, and South 
Africa were spending less on AIDS than expected, and 
Botswana, Kenya, Mozambique, Zambia, and Rwanda 
were spending more than expected. Although the results 
of the two studies generally agree, Galárraga’s ﬁ ndings 
suggest that Mozambique is making quite a strong eﬀ ort 
whereas our analysis suggests the country might be able 
to do much more. Likewise, Galárraga’s ﬁ ndings show 
Namibia as an under-spender, whereas in our analysis it 
is the only country apart from Botswana to budget more 
than 1% of GDP to AIDS expenditure, and it is already 
covering its full resource needs estimate.
The benchmarks we propose have several limitations. 
First, our work was restricted to countries with relatively 
high-burden generalised epidemics. The benchmarks 
might be less useful for assessments of AIDS spending 
in settings with concentrated epidemics. Second, the 
available data about government health expenditure and 
government AIDS expenditure remain imperfect. Even 
when diﬀ erent countries use similar methods to estimate 
government AIDS expenditure, substantial uncertainty 
persists regarding the reported point estimates for each 
country. Moreover, variation across countries in the 
application of government AIDS expenditure measure-
ment methods, such as the proportionate allocation of 
shared health-care resources to AIDS programmes, 
could also generate inconsistencies in the reported 
spending levels. In some countries, subtracting external 
funds for health that are channelled through the 
government’s budget system to generate domestically 
sourced funds is challenging. These limitations make it 
more diﬃ  cult to assess whether or not a country is 
meeting the proposed benchmarks for AIDS spending.
A third limitation is that the share of national health 
budget allocated to AIDS might reasonably depend on 
other factors in addition to AIDS’s share of disease burden, 
such as the cost–eﬀ ectiveness of available interventions to 
address each category of disease burden in a country and 
the amount of money spent on these interventions at full 
scale. For example, if more DALYs can be averted by a set 
of non-AIDS interventions that exhaust the health budget 
before AIDS interventions with favourable cost-
eﬀ ectiveness are funded, then it might be reasonable for 
AIDS programmes to have quite low domestic funding. 
Conversely, other resource allocation algorithms that 
consider objectives beyond pure maximisation of DALYs 
averted, such as schemes ensuring a basic set of services of 
reasonable value in all disease areas, can also aﬀ ect the 
share of national health budgets devoted to AIDS. Unless 
countries have an explicit, transparent process for 
allocation of health resources, and without comprehensive 
Economic trends 
scenario
Abuja target 
scenario*
DALY share 
scenario*
Maximum eﬀ ort 
scenario*
Resource needs estimate $7·9 billion $7·9 billion $7·9 billion $7·9 billion
Flat PEPFAR funding level† $3·3 billion $3·3 billion $3·3 billion $3·3 billion
Flat non-PEPFAR external funding level‡ $1·1 billion $1·1 billion $1·1 billion $1·1 billion
Government AIDS expenditure, uncapped $2·5 billion $3·5 billion $5·4 billion $7·0 billion
Government AIDS expenditure, capped by resource needs estimate $2·4 billion $3·2 billion $4·4 billion $5·1 billion
Capped government AIDS expenditure/resource needs estimate§ 30% 40% 55% 64%
Number of countries that would cover >75% of resource needs estimate 2 2 3 3
Number of countries that would cover >50% of resource needs estimate 2 4 4 5
Number of countries that would cover >25% of resource needs estimate 4 6 6 10
Number of countries in which donors could reduce funding§ 8 8 9 9
Potential donor reduction without redistribution§ $0·7 billion (16%) $1·0 billion (24%) $1·4 billion (31%) $1·8 billion (41%)
Potential donor reduction after redistribution¶ $0 (0%) $0 (0%) $0·8 billion (18%) $1·5 billion (35%)
PEPFAR share of reductions|| 75% 78% 73% 75%
Monetary amounts are in billions of US$. PEPFAR=US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. *These scenarios also include expected increases in government AIDS 
expenditure due to economic trends. †Based on 2012 country operational plans for individual countries, which totalled $3·3 billion, and does not account for already 
negotiated partnership framework implementation plans in South Africa and Nigeria that have built-in reductions over the next 5 years. ‡Based on 2010 development 
assistance for health for HIV/AIDS for individual countries (source: IHME24). §Assumes that reductions in one country are not redistributed to other countries in the group that 
have remaining resource gaps. ¶Assumes that donors would redistribute funds to countries in the group with remaining resource gaps. ||Assumes the PEPFAR share of 
reductions in each country is proportional to its 2010 level share of external support for AIDS, which ranges from 51% in Ethiopia to 96% in Botswana (76% overall).
Table 5: AIDS resource needs, domestic and external shares, potential external funding reductions, and residual gaps: average annual values for 2014–18 
under alternative scenarios
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data about how government expenditure on health is 
allocated across diseases and the cost-eﬀ ectiveness of 
related interventions, whether or not the extant allocation 
for a given disease area is consistent with country priorities 
is diﬃ  cult to judge.
A further limitation concerns the estimation of AIDS 
resource gaps. Resource needs estimates in AIDS 
national strategic plans, where available, are often much 
higher than UNAIDS investment framework estimates. 
Since the resource needs estimate per person living with 
HIV is not correlated with income, we have presented 
projections of government expenditure on AIDS that are 
both capped by resource needs estimates and uncapped. 
Eﬀ orts are currently underway at UNAIDS to revise and 
improve estimates of national resource needs.
Our analysis suggests that, across these 12 sub-
Saharan African countries, total and domestic AIDS 
spending varies widely after factoring in each country’s 
ability to pay and the size of its AIDS burden. The 
reasons for this variation remain unclear, but possible 
causes include political commitment, quality and 
eﬃ  ciency of services, degree of integration within the 
overall health system, population density and the 
presence of diﬃ  cult-to-reach populations, and 
competing health and social sector priorities, in addition 
to other spending priorities (including external debt and 
defence). Future research could explore the signiﬁ cance 
of these factors for AIDS spending.
Although our analysis suggests that most of the 
countries studied here could feasibly increase their 
domestic spending on AIDS, it will be challenging for 
these and other countries with large AIDS burdens to 
rapidly increase ﬁ nancing in line with the benchmarks 
explored in this report. Many obstacles exist against a 
rapid increase in national funding, including tight 
budgets, limited ﬁ scal space, and competing priorities in 
many countries, insuﬃ  cient political commitment in 
others, and, in some cases, an ingrained donor dependency 
mentality. Countries might be able to generate expanded 
revenues through innovative mechanisms such as 
earmarked levies and so-called sin taxes (such as those on 
tobacco and sugary drinks), or through universal health 
coverage schemes with guaranteed packages of services 
including HIV prevention and AIDS treatment and care.36 
Additional analysis, including historical assessment of the 
strategies used by countries and the pace with which they 
have been able to raise domestic budgets both for health 
generally and for speciﬁ c health priorities such as AIDS, 
would help to inform the development of realistic 
timelines for countries to pursue to reach benchmark 
AIDS funding levels.
As PEPFAR, the Global Fund, and the governments of 
low-income and middle-income countries advance in 
designing and negotiating AIDS ﬁ nancing agreements, 
such as partnership framework implementation plans, 
country health partnerships, and Global Fund grant 
agreements, the approaches developed in this Article could 
be used by all parties to agree on monitorable ﬁ nancial 
targets. Ultimately, however, the setting of funding targets 
must be done at the national level, through a collaborative 
process involving the government and donors. In this way, 
the ﬁ scal ﬂ exibility and potential of each country can be 
explored fully, improving the chances that the adopted 
spending targets will be owned by the government and 
donors and thus implemented in practice. The benchmarks 
proposed here, along with data about AIDS expenditures 
and resource needs, can be further reﬁ ned as they are used 
in future country-level exercises to establish the appropriate 
levels of ﬁ nancial burden sharing between national 
governments and donors.
Resource mobilisation and spending commitments 
for AIDS will cont inue to need negotiation and dialogue, 
both within countries and between countries and 
donors, that consider contextual factors. Nevertheless, 
the type of benchmarking done in this analysis can add 
Panel: Research in context
Systematic review
We did a systematic review of published studies related to HIV and AIDS expenditure and 
domestic contributions. We searched PubMed and Google Scholar for English-language 
articles published between 2008 and October, 2014, using the search terms “HIV” or 
“AIDS” and “ﬁ nancing”, “funding”, “spending”, “resources”, or “expenditure” in the article 
title. We then reviewed the articles to establish whether they discussed benchmarks for 
AIDS spending or assessed current AIDS spending levels. Relevant ﬁ ndings included 
UNAIDS’ Domestic Investment Priority Index and several recent studies.11,21,23,32,33,35,36 Several 
of these recent works have rigorously assessed the dispersion of domestic AIDS spending 
patterns, to categorise and analyse prevailing practices. However, most of the existing 
studies judge countries’ recent past performance relative to peers rather than against 
normative reference points. Existing studies are also limited in how far they explore the 
implications of future changes in domestic ﬁ nancing for both countries and donors. Those 
that did were focused on scenarios in which only the lower performers improve or were 
several years old.
Interpretation
This study adds to the existing published literature by applying a range of benchmarks to 
domestic AIDS spending and by creating a policy-oriented foundation for the analysis by 
projecting future funding scenarios, calculating their implications on remaining resource 
gaps, and quantifying the reduced role for external ﬁ nancing. In this study, we compare 
levels of domestic spending on AIDS with four normative benchmarks, based on expected 
economic growth, health spending as a share of total government spending, AIDS 
spending as a share of health spending compared with AIDS’s share of the disease burden, 
and a combination of all three. We calculate future domestic spending under the 
assumption that countries meet each benchmark and compare these spending levels with 
estimated resource needs and expected donor ﬁ nancing. We ﬁ nd that AIDS spending 
varies greatly, even after we account for income level and epidemic size, which is 
consistent with previous work. We also note heavy dependence on donor funds from the 
low-income and lower-middle-income countries, which would be unable to cover their full 
resource needs even if they met the most ambitious of the four scenarios. Conversely, 
upper-middle-income countries would be able to cover their full resource needs under 
several spending scenarios. These ﬁ ndings suggest that donor funding could be reduced in 
the upper-middle-income countries, if spending were to increase in line with our targets, 
to free up resources that could potentially be reallocated to cover persisting gaps in the 
lower-income countries.
Articles
www.thelancet.com/lancetgh   Vol 3   January 2015 e60
useful reference points on which to base these 
discussions and resulting agreements, which will have a 
major eﬀ ect on the lives of tens of millions of people in 
developing countries.
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